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CHiNA’S LEGAL BATTLES IN THF WTO
Henry Ci()
A ssistaii I Pro fcss)r, Tacitlt of Lmi’, The L Iiin’crsift of Hoi i Koi i
For 111(1111/ Ob5L’1’L1S, (1 lila/Or L’/i(lllc1ic raised bi Chum ‘s (IcccssioIi /0 the
JVorltl Trade aiiiatioii ‘1/\/TC)) i whether the WTC) dispute
scttleiiieiif sisfciii (DSS) could cope wit/i Chum, one of the iiiiijor traders
iii f/ic world wine/i operates under aim ecoimoiiiif flint is hi’ilf-wai between
coiiiiiiaiid ecoimoini, and iiiarket ecolionu,. Iii timi’-c article, f/ic au thor
aiiali:es Chum ‘s experience iii f/ic L)SS ln r’ icwiiig the cases C/mum has
participa fed siimce its flCCeSSlOli, amid cojicluedes that f/ic L)SS has
beeii quite effrctive iii dealing wit/i Chiiiui. Iii the authors ‘icw, sue/i
success is lareli due to f/ic/act f/mat the senior leadership in Chum has so
far attached dispmportionnte iimiportaiice to the 055 and thus tended to
az’oid f/ic use of if. This does not necessarili imican, howerer, flint friimal
1VTO dispuite set flenient should be p1(151/ed iii dealing with
ChIna. Instead, f/ic oz’er—reliance on frnmal ‘VTO dispute settleineiif
iiii/if icc/i lead to lila/or policii s/iifts iii C/iiimii, whic/m could iii tuerli
greatly undcrniine f/ic e/fr’cfiz’eiiess of f/ic 055 as a pouch tool against
China.
For many observers, a major practical question raised by China’s
accession to the WTO is the following: Can the DSS cope with
China? On the one hand, there is a legalistic rule-based dispute
settlement system, which has been regarded by some aS the
“crown-jewel of the WTO” as well as “the most important
LLM, London; jF), V(ndrhiIt; \ssist(nt I’i Hii1t ot I aw, I pii t\ I in’tor
i\sia InternatioiiaI F’OflOIflW I_(IV itid Po1ic’ (L\IT1 Irogrin, ii LniVUrit\ of I long
Kong. Iliis artnIo bonetits from tlw g iwrou cupport provided by the Sed F nding br
Basic Research at Ilie LTniversitv of I long Kong, ac veII as the 5trateic Research Ciant
(fl KtV IfltCflItitlOflcll law Issues in the 1eacetuI Rise of China From the \ Iini’trv ol
Education of China. flw author can he ieij’ied h\ email at aohen ugmaiL om
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international tribunal”.’ On the other hand, there is a country that
has long been perceived as one that defies international standards,
one that cherishes its hard-won sovereignty so much that it
generally shuns from the jurisdictions of international tribunals,
even though some of its citizens have served
or are
serving as
judges in these tribunals. Two more factors further complicate the
situation: First, unlike most other international tribunals, which
normally do not have compulsory jurisdiction, the ‘vVTO dispute
settlement body (DSI3) does enjoy mandatory jurisdiction for the
following reasons: a) The WTO Understanding
on Rules arid
Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes (Dispute
Settlement Understanding or DSU) is a multilateral agreement
rather than pluri-lateral agreement,
which means that all WTO
members (X’\1T0 Members) must accept this agreement as part
of
their term to get into the WTO; b) according to
articles 3 and 23 of
the DSU, WTO Members shall adhere to “the rules
and
procedures” in
the DSU, and shall “have recourse to, and abide by,
the rules and procedures” of the
DSU in seeking “the redress
of a
violation of obligations or
other nullification or impairment of
benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment
to the
attainment of any objective of the covered agreements”;
and c)
thanks to the new “reverse consensus” principle established
in
articles 6, 16 and 17 of the DSU, the consent of
the respondent or
losing WTO Member
is no longer needed
for the initiation of the
dispute settlement process
or the adoption of panel
or
appellate
body (Appellate Body) reports. Second,
as noted by the former
Director of the WTO Appellate Body Secretariat,
the major traders
are usually also the major users
of the DSS.2 For example, the two
largest traders,
the United States (US) and the European
Communities (EC), are the most active participants
of the DSS,
while the other major traders, such as Australia,
Brazil, Canada,
India, Japan, Korea,
Mexico and New Zealand, are also very
active.3 Even before its accession to the WTO,
China was already
I Matsushita, Schoenbaum & Mavroidis, The World
Trade Organization: Lwv, Practice
and Polic , Oxford, 2003, at pIS.
2 Valerie I lughes, VT() L)isputc Sftlc,,u’;it: Past,
Prc’sczt tz,iii FutTrL’, in Henry Gao and Don
Lewis, Chum ‘s [‘artü’ipatTh’i ii, the IVT(), Cameron May, 2005,
at pp 272-273.
hi.
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one of the major traders of the world, as well as one of the most
important trading partners of most countries in the world. Also, as
China has vet to develop a mature market economy, there are
many problems in the economic and trade policies of China.
Before China’s accession to the WTO, its trade partners could unIv
try to resolve these issues through bilateral negotiations. After
China’s accession, however, they have every right to drag China
before DSB for any trade issues. This leads to the worries that
China’s accession will result in “a flood of disputes [which] could
overwhelm the already over-burdened system” . The problem,
however, is that “Chinese foreign policy is deeply state-centric and
protection of sovereignty is at its core”. Thus, “[tjhere is serious
concern that China would likely regard these actions as political
and, to save face, simply reject the process itself”. If China indeed
chooses to
reject or attack the DSS, the credibility of the system
would he seriously undermined.7
On the other hand, some other observers, especially
multinational
corporations with experience in China, argue that
that there will he very few, if any, disputes. The business
communities fear that their
complaints will not he well-taken h
the Chinese government and they might fall out of favour or even
he retaliated by the Chinese government for such complaints.’
Instead, “[tjhev would prefer informal behind-the-scene,
government-to-government talks so that some new deal could he
worked out”.’° This would result in a two-track trading system:
“one set of transparent dispute-settlement rules for all WTO
members
except China and another set of opaque bilateral
arrangements for China”.’
I Other WTO Members would question
Sylvia Ostrv, P\T() ilcni1erIiq fr Uii,ia: J R 1wd \t t Rt: l tlmf flu’ :\ i’i’r in I itriK
c;rad\’ and Andrev Sharpe (eds.), Tue lafe i f L((lle,,liec lii (miuilti: l-efelirift 71/
I )m’id Staler, 2001 , p 2.
Id.
Id.
—
1(1.
., Id.
Id.
III.
II Id.
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the fairness of such
arrangements and this again could cast doubt
on the
credibility or even legitimacy of the system.12
In the view of the author, this question is best answered by
reviewing China’s post-accession experience with the DSS. Since
its accession, China has participated in one case as the
complainant, i.e. the US
—
Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports
of Certain Steel Products (US-Steel Safeguards) case; two disputes and
four cases’3 as the respondent, i.e. China
— Value-Added Tax on
Integrated Circuits (VAT Rebate) case and the China
— Measures
Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts
case. in addition, China
barely missed being brought before the
WTO in two cases, i.e., the
case on coke export restraint and the case
on
antidumping duties
on kraft linerboard. In the following part, these cases
will be
discussed in chronological order.
US-Steel Safeguards
This case concerns definitive
safeguard measures on imports of
certain flat steel, hot-rolled bar, cold-finished bar, rehar, certain
welded tubular products, carbon and alloy fittings, stainless steel
bar, stainless steel rod, tin mill products and stainless steel wire. It
was brought by China in March 2002 along with seven other
countries, including EC, Japan, Korea, Switzerland, Norway, New
Zealand and Brazil. In its request for consultations, China claimed
that the US measures were inconsistent with various provisions of
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAH) 1994 and the
Safeguard Agreement. On 11 July 2003,
the panel circulated its
report and concluded that all the US’s safeguard
measures at issue
12 Id.
In the VVTO, a single trade measure of a Member might be simultaneously challenged by
several WTO Members. Each Member is entitled to bring their separate complaint, which
will be assigned a unique case number. In order to ensure consistency and efficiency in
the dispute settlement Panel’s examination of the measure, however, the VTO normally
would establish only one Panel for such dispute and the Panel will examine all
complaints in this dispute. Thus, one dispute in the WTO might encompass
several cases.
See eg Article 9 of the DSU.
14 This case was brought after the article was drafted. As the parties were still
in
consultation at the time this article is submitted, the author only has limited information
available on this case. Ihus, this case will not be discussed in this article.
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inconsistent with it least one of the following WTC) prerequisites
prerequisites tor the in4osition of safeguard measure: lack of
demonstration of (i) unforeseen developments; (ii) increased
imports; (iii) causation; and (iv) parallelism. These conclusions
vere ultimately affirmed by the Appellate Body in its report
issued on 10 November 2003, albeit on slightly different grounds.’
According to article 8 of the Safeguards Agreement, WTO
Members which would he affected by safeguard measures have
the
right to retaliate against the WTO Member invoking such
measures by suspending the application of su hstantiallv
equivalent concessions to the trade of such WTO Member. Of
course, the same article also provides that the right of suspension
shall not he exercised for the first three years that a
safeguard
measure is in effect, provided that the safeguard measure has been
taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports and that such a
measure conforms to the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement.
Even though, at least according to the US, some of the safeguards
measures taken in this case were based on absolute import
increase, their conformity with the WTO rules in the Safeguard
Agreement had been called into question from the very beginning.
Thus, China could have taken justice into its own hands by
retaliating against the US. Indeed, that is exactly what the EC, one
of the
co-complainants in the case, has done. On 13 June 2002, the
EC issued Council Regulation No. 1031/2(102. According to this
regulation, the EC would suspend its tariff concessions granted to
the US from 18 June 2002, and apply nddititnial duties of up to 100%
on such products from as early as 1 August 2002.17 The retaliation
list includes products from many politically sensitive states, such
as citrus fruits (Florida), textile (Carolinas), FTarlev-Davidson
Panel Report, L1iih’t1 5hIt’ — Ot’fluiitn’’ 5ifrimrLI \ h’asiir’ ii J11lJ?ut f :rtvH tLi)
Preducfs i/DS248, WT/DS249, WI/D251, WT/{)5252, \17D23, \i D2E4,
WT/DS258, WF/DS25’), cdopted 10 E)ecember 20fl3, is moditied by the AppeLate P’odv
Report, WT/DS248AB/R, \17DS249\B/R, WT,”0525IAB/R, \\1 ,“D2I\B,R,
Wi / E)S253A13/ R, Wi/ 0S254AB/ R, WI / F)5258AB,’ R, \\17/ i)S2.)AB/ R.
Appellate Body Report, (liiited 5[ate — 1)’fI!11tflE N?f!1tir/ A1ensii,i eu iitiief et(’tlIu!
Sh’t’l Pmdzicts, WF/ 05245AB/ R, V17 DS24YAI3/ R. V 1/05251 AB/ R, \i’,’ [)2AB: R.
‘VT/I)S253Al3/R, ‘vVl’/I)5254AB/R, ‘vI’/[)525AB/R, \‘Vi /DS59AB/R, adopted 10
I )eember 2(Xfl.
Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the 0 unci1 Regulation No. I IR I ,2002 (emphasis 1ded
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motorcycles (Wisconsin). Unlike the EC, however, China seems to
be content to choose the multilateral route.
Whether the other WTO Members realize it or not, this case
reveals a
significant shift in China’s foreign trade policy. Before
this case, China was a frequent user of retaliatory measures. For
example, in 2001, when Japan imposed safeguard measures on
Chinese onions, mushrooms and tatarni rushes valued at 150
million USD, China quickly responded with 100% extra
tariffs on
the I billion USD imports of automobiles, mobile phones
and air-
conditioners from Japan.15 In the same year, when
Korea
slapped a
315% tariff on the imports of Chinese garlic worth some
20 million
USD, China threatened with a temporary ban on cellular phones
and polyethylene goods from Korea,
which together worth more
than 660 million USD.’t One might argue that this policy shift
is
simply because that, before
its accession, China could not use the
DSS; while after accession, it is required by article 23 of the
DSU to
“have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures
of [the
DSUJ”. While there is some truth
in this
argument, it could
not
explain why article
23 of the DSU has not stopped the US from
applying various highly-controversial
unilateral measures, such as
the Section 301 clauses.2U Furthermore, as the author pointed out
above, article 8 of the Safeguards Agreement
does provide the
possibility of
retaliation without seeking the authorization
from
the DSB first.
Defying some of
the gloomy predictions
mentioned earlier,
China seems to he quite willing, at
least in this case, to abide by
the uniform rules for all WTO Members rather than trying to
force
upon the
other WTO Members “another set of opaque bilateral
arrangements”. Moreover,
while this case sets an example of
IS For the background on this case, see Jizpnn—CIii;ia
IlThIt’ i\ir at a Cmssreatis: Expt’rts
available at :/JgIish.peopledai1Y.cOTTh/ 200106/25/ eng2kH
1)625_73422.h. For
a detailed discussion of this case, scc Junji Nakagava, L svnsfroni flit’ Ja,ian—C’Iii;ia
‘1 Vclsli
Onion l4ir”, (2002) 36 Journal of World Trade, at pp. 1019—1036.
For the background on this case, see
South Korea to Import Chinese Garlic to Avoid
Trade
War.
http:/ /eng1ish.peopledaiIy.c0rn.cfl/ iglish/2001
04/1 7/eng200IO4l 7_678t7.html.
For a classical review of the Section 301 , see Robert
E. Hudec, 77ii,ikm’ about flu’ Ncu’
Scct ion 301: Bciioiid (.ooii anti F’il, in Essatis on tlit’ Natim’ of’
Infcrnafioiial Trade Laze,
Cameron May, 19)9, at pp 153-206.
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China trying to defend its interests using the DSS, the subsequent
history shows that China has been very cautious even in asserting
its
rights of using the DSS: more than four years after China’s
accession, this case remains as the first and the only complaint
China ever launched in the WTO. Indeed, as the top target of trade
remedies measures worldwide, if China were to challenge each
and every trade remedies measures taken
against it in the WTO,
the DSS would not have any
capacity left to deal with any other
disputes filed by other WTO Members. Fortunately, China so far
has not shown an interest in
opening up the floodgate. As the
author has
argued in another article, China’s decision to join the
US-Steel Safeguards case was driven almost entirely by a few
factors which, put together, make the case a unique one.2’ Once
these factors are gone, China has been trying to avoid resorting to
the dispute settlement mechanism as much as it could.
VAT Rebate
This case was brought by the US in March 2004 and is also the first
case ever brought against China by any WTO Member. It
concerns
China’s rebates for value-added tax (VAT) on integrated circuits
(ICs) manufactured or designed in China. In its request for
consultations, the US identified its basis as follows:
“China provides for a 17 per cent VAT on ICs. However, we
understand that enterprises in China are entitled to a partial
refund of the VAT on ICs that they have produced, resulting
in a lower VAT rate on their products. China therefore
appears to he subjecting imported ICs to higher taxes than
applied to domestic ICs and to he according less favourable
treatment to imported ICs.
In addition, we understand that China allows for a partial
refund of VAT’ for domestically-designed ICs that, because of
I Icnrv (1ao, A,çiisn’t’ Lesn/is,ii: flu’ Fnf Ainii 1- v’ru’iic’ flu! L’sui fn Cliu,iu, in Fkmr
( ,1() and [)()fl ICWiS, (Jiiiiii ‘ PtlrfhI1l(ltlful iii f/h’ \1t , (dnwr(Th May, 2005, at pp 34—3,
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technological limitations, are manufactured outside of China.
China thus
appears to be providing for more favourable
treatment of imports from one Member than another, and
discriminating against services and service suppliers of other
Members” 22
Even though a total of six regulations issued by various
Chinese minisHes from June 2000 to December 2003 have been
identified by the US as measures at issues,3
the only thing that
really matters is the one regulation
that provided the key
framework for the rebate scheme. This is the Notice of the State
Council Regardi;zg JssuallCe of Certaiii
Policies to Pmmote the
Dez’elopiiieiit of the Software Iiidustri
ii,id Integrated Circuit I;idustrii
of 24 June 2000, popularly known as “Docuineiit
18” because its file
number is 2000-18. Article 41 of Docuineiit 18 provides a rebate of
the amount of the effective VAT burden in excess of 6% for ICs
manufactured within China, while the statutory VAT rate on sales
of all imported and domestically-produced
ICs is 17%.24 Article 48
of the same document, together with the
Notice of the Ministn of
Finance, State Adiniiiistration of Taxation Regarding Tax Policies for
Imports of Integrated
Circuit Products Doinesticallii Designed mid
Fabricated Abroad, provides tax
rebate of the amount of the
effective VAT burden in excess of 6% for iCs designed in China
C/mm - alit’-Adlcd 7zx on I,if”rah’l Circuits, Request for Consultations by the United
States, \T/ 1)5309/1
They are: Document 18 (24 June 2000), Nofict’ of flit’ Statc Council R’mlnz\’ Issiia,icc f
Ct’rtaiii Policics Co,ict’niiii tlit’ L)cz’t’Iopiiicii f of flit’ Sftzt’nrt’ hidustri and lpitt’ratcd Circuit
lndufri Document 25 (22 ¶Scptember 2000), Not ict’ of flit’ Ainiistn of Iuiaiicc,
Sfafc
Al,,iuiistratio,i of Taxation, tvitl Gt’zcral AI,,ii,i,ti’afioii of l1sf()111s on R’l’z’aiit
Ta. Policii
Issiit’s Coiitt’771ii1 Encoit ra\’llis’ flu’ flt’r’t’lopint’iit of
flit’ Sottn’iirt’ l,itliesfri, and the I,itt’raft’l
Circuit Indies fn Document 86 (7 March 2002), Nofic’ of fhit Minis fni of liifonuatioii
hit/nsf nj
Rt’anhiii lssiuiiict’ of RtN1eIat1tni
on (t’rtifit’ahoii of 1,itt’raft’tI Circuit Dt’siii Eiitt’17’rIst’s a,id
Products; Document 70 (10 October 2002), Notice of flit’ A lniisfnj of Fmanct’,
State
Ah,ni,iisfrafioii of Taxation I ‘anhiei Eu ,‘tlit’riii, Tax Policies
to E,icourat’ flu’ R’zt’loj’iiit’;i I of
flit’ Sofiwarc Intlustni nut! huift’çratt’tl Circuit h,idustni;
Document 140 (25 October 2002),
Notict’ of flit’ Mi,iisfrt of f’i,uiznce, State Ahini,iistrafioui of
Taxation lçan1uui,’ Ta.x Policies fci
huui1’oi’f,’ of 1uittc,rafetl
Circuit Products flo,nesficahhti fl’si,ii’d tuuid Falir,cnfetl Abroad; and
[)ocumt’nt 1384 (23 December 2003), Notice of flu State 1’ldu,iinist
ration of Taxtifioui Resa,thuuis,,’
isie(uuic(’ of flu’ (ntaloiit’ of hi tesratt’cl Circuit Products E,ijotjiizs P,ifen’uifial
Ta. (First Batch).
On 10 October 2002, the Ministry of Finance and State
Administration of Taxation issued
another notice to further expand the VAT rebate
to any tax burden that exceeds 3’.
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but tabricaWd abroad due to the lack of technological capacities
domesticall.
According to the US, these measures violated China’s
obligations under articles I and III
of the GATT 1994, the Protocol
on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China (WT/ [/432),
and article XVII of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(CATS). The US did not elaborate on how these measures violated
the relevant
obligations, hut in the view of the author, the
arguments would be essentially the following:
1. Article 41 rebate makes the VAT rate for domestically
manufactured ICs lower than that for imported ICs,
thus violates the national treatment obligation under
GATT article III;
2. For imported products, article 48 rebate makes the VAT
rate for those designed in China lower than that for
those designed abroad, thus violated the most-favored-
nation (MFN) obligation under GATT article I;
3. For IC design services and service providers, article 48
rebate makes the VAT rate For those services and service
providers in China lower than that for those services
and service providers abroad, thus violated the nationa.l
treatment
obligation under CATS article XVII.
China’s initial reaction to the US
complaint is rather
interesting. On 19 March, a day after the US made its request for
consultations, Mr. Chong Quan, the spokesperson for the Ministry
of Commerce (MOFCOM), announced that China was “confused”
by the US’s
request.2 According to him, China and the US has
held several rounds of bilateral consultations on the IC VAT rebate
issue, and made certain progress. Now that the US “suddenly”
brought a request for consultation in the WTO while the two
parties are coiidiectiiig consultation already, China feels puzzled.
Nonetheless, he added, China has started to study the US’s
1k ph’ I )i ii v MrJ, 2() 2fl4, I livid I iiws, t p
I I.
iii, iripIiisis added.
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request seriously.2S Actually, it is probably more accurate to say
that China is embarrassed rather than
“puzzled”. According to the
confucianism philosophy which is deeply rooted in the Chinese
society, litigation would cause irreparable harm to the normal
relationships and should be pursued only as a last resort, or,
better
still, as the great philosopher himself would have preferred,
avoided as much as possihle.2 To a large extent, the Chinese
leadership still could not disentangle the legal issues
from political
and diplomatic concerns and views
the initiation of legal disputes
in the WTO synonymous to the break-up of diplomatic
relationship with the other countries.
One
might argue, however,
that China should not “do to others what she do not want done to
herself”;30 as China has sued the US in the WTO in the US-Steel
Safeguards case already,
it is only fair that China should expect to
be sued in the same forum. While this argument seems plausible
on its face, the author has to disagree as the US-Steel Safeguards
case is very different from the current case. In that case, the US
was actually urging the complainants
to bring the case to the
DSS.
In a letter dated 11 March 2002 to the then WTO Director General
Mike Moore, Deputy USTR Linnet Deilv literally begged
the other
WTO Members to file a WTO complaint by noting,
in three
different paragraphs, that “[t]o the
extent [a WTO Member]
considers that the USITC’s findings .. . incorrect”,
it must
“bring its
complaint.., before
the World Trade Organization to
he resolved
under m ultilaterallv-agreed dispute
settlement procedures”,
which is “the right place
to resolve differences”.
31 While this
seems rather bizarre on its face, it is actually ve rational:
as
discussed above, the Safeguards Agreement explicitly grants
affected WTO Members the right to retaliate
in such cases; thus,
for the US, WTO litigation is actually
the lesser of the two evils. In
2
James Legge, T7zc CI,iiics’ CIaics
Vcliii,it’ OlL’: C,iiciii1 Analct’ts, Book XII, Yan Yuan,
Chapter XIII, “The Master said,
‘In hearing litigations, I am like any other
body. What is
necessary, however, is to cause the people to have no litigations”
The full text is aai1able
at http:J/www.gutenberg.ordir5Jet W3Ja
iii Ou.txt.
James Legge, TIu’ C1Ii1L’c C1assic’.
l,/ll111lt’ (iic: Citiit’itiii Ai:alccts, Book XII, Yan ‘ uan.
The United States Mission to the European Union, USTR’s R’ilti Pcf’nds
Siccl Tarif
R’clsi( )?l, Rt’l’ii t EC
L)t’ma,ids.
http:/J www.usEC. ejCaegpr s/Ira /Stei/
Marl I O2USTRDeilySteel.l!tm1.
China’s Legal Battle in the WTO 133
the current ccse, however, China has preferred COnsultatiOn over
IitigdtiOfl clii along the way, and ws really cug1t ott—guard by the
launch of formal dispute settlement procedure by the US.
After several rounds of consultations, China agreed to settle
the case with the US by signing the Mciiiorauduin of LJiidcrstaiidiiig
bclwccii Cliiiia aiitl tlic Ullitc(1 Statcs Rus.’ardiii Chum ‘s Valiec—Adde1
Tax eu Iuitcgmtcd Circuits on 14 July 2004. Essentially, China has
agreed to give in to the requests of the US, with the detailed terms
as follows:
“By 1 November 2004, China will amend the measures
described in the US consultation request (WT/DS309/i) to
eliminate the availability of VAT refunds to firms producing
ICs in China on their domestic sales. The effective date of
these amendments will he no later than 1 April 2005. Until
the effective date of these amendments, VAT refunds will be
available only to integrated circuit enterprises certified under
the measures as of 14 July 2004 in respect of products so
certified as of 14 July 2004.
By 1 September 2004, China will issue a notice to revoke
the measure described in the US consultation
request
(WT/DS309/i) that provides for VAT refunds on iCs
designed in China hut manufactured abroad. The effective
date of revocation will he no later than 1 October 2004.”
Several factors contribute to the prompt settlement of this
dispute. First is the economic factor. Even though Document 18
was drafted with the intention of promoting the development of
home-grown IC industry, its practical effect is exactly the
opposite. The rebate schemes are based on the effective ta\ iate,
which
equals the total tax payable divided by sales. Because
China provides 100% VAT rebate for IC products e\ports, a
company has to sell at least 70-80% of its products domestically
and achieve a gross margin rate of 30% or more in order to be able
Prtam1ik of \fic( f flu’ tnh’ (itiuil 1’,li,i l’uu L’ f (.i’itl1i!i I l?lt f J’lf f/1&
l)t’z’i,uu’f f tli’ ()fft(1r(’ 1,idijt,ij lllfL’\’nhttd UrlHi liiiiitn.
‘t’’ B’li:iit1 flu’ Tax Rcbat’ I 1’ (‘i’ited Aiist . 2O
<http/www.c-crn.çs/ zI/ htmJOO4/ fl4(1S1I11)N2>
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to
enjoy the article 41. rebate.
-‘ Since most of the Chinese
companies export about 70-80% of their products and have a low
gross margin rate, very few of them could enjoy the rehates.3 On
the other hand, the foreign-invested IC companies in China focus
endure the full vigor of the DSS.
Another interesting development
in this case is that Taiwan has also formally requested to join the
consultations. Legally speaking,
Taiwan is a WTO Member in its
own right in the WTO with
the (rather awkward) official name as
“The Separate Customs
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and
Matsu”, short-handed as “Chinese Taipei”. China, however,
has
consistently claimed Taiwan to be one of its separate custom
territories and asked Taiwan to behave accordingly. Actually
Taiwan’s status in the WTO has never been made clear. Even
though article
XII of the Marrakech Agreement states
that
“{a]nv
state or separate customs
territory possessing full
autonomy in the
conduct of its external commercial relations” may apply for
WTO
membership, it is unclear
as to whether Taiwan joined as a “state”
or
“separate customs
territory”. China and Taiwan seem to have
subscribed to different versions of the story. On
the one hand,
S’ IC I )ipiif’ Esalah’I, flu’ LI Bnnilif Im’siiif tiz,,isf
China’s flisc’riniiiiatn’t’ VAT Rlici
<http:/tit.sohu .toniJ 2004/03] 20/82/ artiie2195l 0sh> (visited
3 August 2005).
Iii.
Id.
Artide 52 of Nnfict f flu’ Sfah’ ii,u’il Rt’’arIiii lsiuiii’ f
Ccrtain Palit’ics Cniin’r,ii;i’ flit’
1).nclniiiu’iit flu’ $nftii’arc l,idiistni and hit
nztol (iiciiif l,idusfni.
Set’ IC I )ispuh’ Escalated, flu’ US Bniiilif Ijiwsuit a’aiiist
Uii,uz’s L)iscri,niilatnhe VAT PeI:cii
<http:/ / it.sohu .eomj 2004J03/ 20JS2Jar6cl2l
95 1220.shtrnl> (visited 3 August1 2005)
Request to Join (onsultations, Communication
from the Separate Customs l’erritorv
of
Taiwan, Penghu1 Kirimen and Matsu,
5 April 2004, WT/0S309/5.
on high-end products and thus
ratc.3h They also sell most of
Document 18
applies to all
ownership structure,37 most of
benefit from the rebate schemes
such as Motorola.35 Second is
above, the mere threat of legal
by the Chinese leadership as
diplomatic significance.
In
embarrassment, China would
have a much higher gross margin
their products within China. As
companies irrespective of the
the
companies that were able to
are
actually foreign-invested firms,
the political factor. As mentioned
action itself would he interpreted
something of great political and
order to avoid the political
rather settle it than having to
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China claiis that l’aiwan is a sit’ custonis hrritoi-v’ f (hini,
because TaiWan’S OffjCc1i title iiicludcs t1i ftrni
“%pcratu
Custons lerritorv while the short—hand nnie re[er to
‘
(1iiiiis’
Taipei”, which, putting together, mean that ‘Faiwan
is a
“separatu
customs territory ot China. On the other hand, Taiwan could
claim that, rather than implying Taiwan is part of China, the word
“Chinese” in “Chinese Taipei” could simply refer to “people of
Chinese descent”. Indeed, since Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (Hong Kong) and Macau Special
Administrative Region (Macau), two Members which arc
undoubtedly territories of China, have their names as “Hong
Kong, China” and “Macau, China”, respectively, and Taiwan
joined the WT() after these two territories did, if the WTC)
Members wanted to confirm that Taiwan has the same status as
Hong Kong and Macau, they should have used “Taiwan, China”
instead of “Chinese Taipei”. Furthermore, its full title does not
indicate the proper sovereign of such “separate customs territory”.
Indeed, a precondition for any separate customs territory to join
the WTO is that it has been granted “full autonomy in the conduct
of its external commercial relations” by its sovereign, hut neither
Taiwan has
requested China, nor China has granted Taiwan such
autonomy. Putting this difficult question aside, Taiwan’s request
to join consultations has really stepped on China’s nerves. Even
though the mere participation of a WTO Member in the DSS
would not entail any connotations of
sovereignty, as a separate
customs territory is fully entitled to such
right, both China and
Taiwan
regarded such act as implying that Taiwan is on par with
China as an
equal sovereign. On 28 April 2004, China filed an
Acceptance of the Requests to Join Consultations.
31 fri this
communication, China acknowledged the requests to join
consultations from the EC, Japan, Mexico, and Taiwan, hut only
the first three
requests were declared to he accepted. This is rather
strange as request to join consultations have rarely been denied in
the WTO. According to article 4.11 of the DSLJ, “[wihenever a
Member other than the
consulting Members considers that it has a
Sh )rter Oxford Eng1i’h I )ictiorir\’, 5 td i tic.fl.
1
Wf/ F)S3I/n.
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substantial trade interest in consultations being held pursuant to
paragraph I of article XXII of GAIT 1994, paragraph I of article
XXII of GATS, or the corresponding provisions in other covered
agreements, such Member may notify the consulting Members
and the DSB, within 10 days after the date of the circulation of the
request for consultations under said article, of its desire to he
joined in the consultations. Such Member shall he joined in the
consultations, provided that the Member to which the request for
consultations was addressed
agrees that the claim of substantial
interest is well-founded.” Thus, there are three requirements for a
WTO Member to file the request to join consultations. First, the
request shall he filed within ten days after the date
of the
circulation of the request for consultations. In this case, the US
request for consultations was circulated
on 23 March, while the
Taiwan’s
requçst was made on I April, and thus is
within the time
limit. Second, such WTO Member has to have “substantial trade
interest”. Again Taiwan seems to satisfy
this
requirement as well,
as Taiwan noted in its request that “[a]ccording to our customs
statistics, we are one of China’s largest suppliers of integrated
circuits. In 2003, China’s imports from us reached a
total value of
about US$ 1.8 billion. This figure, as a matter of act, has been
increasing annually at the
rates of 13.9%, 181.6% and 105.1% for
each of the last three years” . Third, the respondent in the case
has
to
agree that the
claim of substantial interest is well-founded. This
requirement is
rather subjective and China, as the respondent in
this case, has the full discretion in determining whether Taiwan’s
claim of substantial interest is well-founded. Even though China
has not indicated in its communication as to whether Taiwan’s
claim is well-founded, this is probably the only ground
on which
China could deny the request
from Taiwan. However, to counter
the unrestrained discretion of the respondent, the
same DSU
article also states that “[ijf the request to he joined in the
consultations is not accepted, the WTO applicant
Member shall he
free to request consultations
under paragraph
1 of article XXII or
paragraph
I of article XXIII of GAIT 1994, paragraph 1 of
article
XXII or paragraph
1 of article XXIII of GATS, or the corresponding
‘ ]‘/ DS309/ 5.
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provisions in other covered agreements.” Furthermore, according
to the well-established WTO jurisprudence, there is no
requirement tor either an economic/trade interest or legal interest
for a WTO Member to invoke the WT() dispute settlement
procedures; instead, a potential interest in trade in goods or
services at ISSUe and a general interest in preserving the rule-based
system is sufficient.4 Thus, Taiwan could have brought a separate
complaint on its own. In the author’s view, the public humiliation
that such
complaint might bring to the Chinese leadership is
probably another important reason that made China decide to
settle promptly, even though the legal merits of such a case are
debatable .44
China - Measures Affecting the Export of Coke
Less than two weeks after the US launched its case against China’s
VAT rebate on ICs, the EC also openly challenged China’s
measures
affecting the exports of coke, requesting China to abolish
the measure or face another case at the WTO.
Coke, which is produced by heating the coal in a hightemperature,
hightemperature, oxygen-free furnace, is the main fuel used in making
steel from iron ore. China is the world’s top producer and exporter
of coke. In 2003, the total global coke output is 390 million metric
ton (MT), with the Chinese production at 177 million MT, or 45°
of the world total production.4 In the same year, China’s coke
export reached 14.7 million M F, nearly 60 of the world s total.
The EC, in particular, relies heavily on coke imports from China.
In 2003 alone, the EC imported from China 4.4 million MT of coke,
Appellate Body Report, Eiinpeiiii Cnpiiiiiiihe Rtinie [e’ the IH11ert?heH iie liii
T)i’fnbutuni f Baiuinns WT/ 1)527/ AB/ R, adopted 25 September 197, DSR I Q II 5) I
paras 136-136; Panel Report, keiin I )etiiii t’e afiii I A 1et1ie!e eu iuuijierf f tiii I (fl
PnNIu1et, WT/ DS96/ R and Corr. 1, adopted 12 January 2000, as modified b the
Appellate Body Report. WF/ DS)6/ AB/ R, DSR 2k)0. I, 49. para 7. 13.
Sec I Icnrv Gao, AçrL’ss1r’ Lcsilisuui: the Ent kenui Flpene?h ‘ mid Le’ ei LIi:uy1i, in
Flcnrv Gao and Don Lewis, CIii,iii’ Pau’tueiatueui :n flue 1V7’( ), Cameron May, 2I)fl at pp
332-333.
China Metals Report Weekl’, June 8, 2004.
‘ China Metals Report Weekly, June 8, 2004.
I 38 Iaw Lectures for Practitioners 2006
which is more than one third of its total coke
consumption.47 On
the other hand, the coke production process can cause serious
pollution to the environment. Typically, two MT of coal can
produce one MT of coke, while the rest turns into pollutants such
as waste water, atmospheric emissions, and solid wastes. Among
them are sulfur dioxide, a major cause for acid rain, and
henzopyrene, one of the worst carcinogenic chemicals. in recent
years, many coke plants were closed in the EC due to pressures
from environmental protection groups. At the same time, however,
the EC is home to four of the top ten steel rnanufacturers.4S Thus,
the European steel industry relies
more and more on coke imports
from China. This increasing gap between supply and demand
drove the price of coke in international
markets from $56/MT FOB
in 2000 to $400/MT FOB in 2004. Concerned with the potential
environmental implications, the Chinese government
also started
to study the pollution problem
caused by coke-production. in July
2003, the Ministry of Commerce and the National Development
and Reform Commission held a joint meeting on coke export with
several industry associations. At the meeting, many experts
suggested that
the government
limit coke exports to reduce
pollution. On
1 January 2004, China announced that
it would cut
down its coke export quota by
26 from twelve million tons for
2003 to nine million tons to meet the rising demand from
its own
booming steel and power
Worried that it would not
have enough coke for
its domestic steel industries, the EC
demanded China to abolish the quota on 31
March 2004. On 9
May, the EC further announced a five-day
deadline for the
Chinese to get rid of
the quota; otherwise
it will initiate a
complaint at
the WTO. After extensive negotiations,
China
reached a last-minute deal with the EC on 28 May 2004, removing
the imminent threat of a WTO complaint. Under
the agreement,
the European steel
industry would get at least
4.5 million MT of
r China Mta1s Report Weekly, June 5, 2004.
According to the International Iron
and Steel Institute, of the top ten steel firms in 2003,
four of them are FC firms. lucy are Arcelor (Lu\emhurg), LNM Group (Netherlands).
Corus Group (UK/Netherlands), and Thvssen Krupp ((;erm.mv) (visited
3 August 200)
<!ttp:// www.worldsted.org/ media] wsilj
Xinhua News Agency1 May 24, 2004.
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COkC froni Chin in 2004, the sare qumtitv it iiiiported in 2003.
Chin: has also agreed to abolish the fee for t1it export permit, and
this would reduce the price of coke from 45OUSD/ MT to
250 USD/ MT.
As no formal complaint has been lodged at the WTO, the
exact legal basis of the EC’s claim is unclear. In the authors view,
however, the most likely candidate would he article XI.1 of the
GATT, which provides that “[nb prohibitions or restrictions other
than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective
through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall
be instituted or maintained by any contracting partY on the
importation of any product of the territory of any other
contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any
product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.”
As the author has discussed in another article, however, the legal
claims of the EC
might not he as strong as it would want others to
believe. indeed, China could have some strong counter-
arguments by making use of the escape clauses provided for
under articles Xl.2 and XX. Moreover, while the EC itself has
closed its
coke-production factories for environmental concerns, it
still wants China to
supply coke to its steel firms at the expenses of
polluting the environment in China. In essence, what the EC was
doing in this case amounts to exporting pollutions to China. For
the EC, launching such a complaint in the WTO might create more
trouble than it tries to get rid of. It would put the EC in the same
awkward situation as the US was in three years ago, when the US
had to withdraw amid worldwide condemnation its
complaint
against Brazilian law authorizing manu factunng of
pharmaceutical products combating l—JTV/ i-1DS, a case Celso
Amorim, the outspoken Brazilian ambassador to the WTO, called
as not only
“legally unfounded’, but also ‘politically
disastrous”.’ So the question is: why did China want to settle, and
settle so quickly?
I lenrv üao, A,icsn’t’ Lctzlis,ii: flu I al Ajn,j I v”u ‘!l niiil 1 SiN /‘ U11)? Lfl leflF\
(ao and L)on ewis, C/win ‘ Pnrfci1’af,,, :ii f/u I \ i (meron May, 20(b, ‘it pp A3-4S
Vi’() Reporter, Ll,iih’d Sttit [)w/7 \T() (‘ae Au,iI Bni:il ()rr [I/ ‘All ) I?te,1I 1
June 2n, 2()1 ).
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As discussed above, according to section 15(a) of China’s
Accession Protocol, WTO Members may treat China as a non-
market economy in
anti-dumping investigations for fifteen years
after China’s accession to the WTO. This does not mean, however,
that China would always he regarded as non-market economy for
the whole period. Indeed, the same section also provides that,
once China has established, under the national law of the
importing WTO Member, that it is a
market economy, the non-
market economy method shall he terminated. Since its accession,
China has launched a major campaign to lobby other WTO
Members to
recognize China’s market
econonw status. Typically,
this is included as part of the Free Trade Agreement packages
that
China
negotiates with other
countries. As a precondition to such
FTA
negotiations, China
maintains that the other partY should he
prepared to acknowledge
that China is a market economy and it
would not make use of the discriminatory provision provided
for
under section 15(a).3 This strategy has been very successful
with
many of the smaller trading partners of China, including
Australia,
New Zealand, Pakistan, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), all of which have recognized China’s
market econonw
status in their ongoing FTA negotiations
with China. For larger
trading partners, however,
the FTA strategy seems
to he much less
effective, as it is generally much
more difficult for large traders to
enter into FTAs with each other. Instead, China tried to petition
for the grant of market
econonw status through the domestic legal
regime of
its trade partners.
In June 2003, China requested
the EC
to re-assess its Market Economy Status. To prepare
for this
examination, the Ministry of Commerce of
China issued its Own
Report on
the Development of
China’s Market Economy 2003 on
13 April.4 The
EC was scheduled to make a decision on the
market economy status of China in late June of
2004. Thus, China’s
decision to settle the coke dispute on
28 May might be part
of the
Section 15(d), Accession Protocol of China.
See New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
New Zealand—China Fl A —
FQAs at http:JJ www. rnfatgovt.nzl
tr adea mtflN/aiZhinatta/ faqshtml. See also
Chum Striz’cs fir Alarkct
Ecze,iiii
http: / / wwv.china,orgcn/engli5h/ BAT/98789.htiTl.
1 Available at http:Jjwww .china.org.ct/englis1/031u1Pti
7Q4 11 htm.
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plan to pave tlw IVaV
h)1 a Icivorcible decision on the market
COflOfliV StatUS. ‘v\hile the Chinese philosophy teaches people that
favors shall be returned, the Europeans, however, always believe
in the practical philosophy that “[w]e have no eternal allies, iiid
we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and
perpetual. and those interests
it is out- duty to follow”. One
month after, the EC announced that China has failed to satisfy the
standards for granting market economy status, notwithstanding
the “economic progress achieved by China over the past vears”.
A few days later, the EC gave another blow to China by
announcing that it will revamp its Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) trade benefit program for developing countries,
with the result that many Chinese products would no longer be
able to enjoy the GSP henefits.7
In the author’s view, another more important reason for
China’s
eagerness to settle is its fear towards the P55. As the VAT
Rebate case was brought only two weeks before the EC threatened
WTO action, had China not settled the coke case, China would
have to fight two legal battles against two of the most powerful
WTO Members. As China lacks
expertise and resource on WTO
dispute settlement, China would have a very hard time defending
itself in the WTO. Thus, China chose the settle the second case
instead.
China -
Antidumping Duties on Kraft Linerhoard
This case concerns
antidumping actions on US kraft linerboard.
On 31 January 2004, four Chinese companies filed vritten
application to the MOFCOM of China on behalf of the dtmestic
industry against imports of kraft linerboard from US, Thailand,
‘-pedi by Lord PInwr’1on to (1w 1 1ou’ of (oiiinion. FLiiisird, I \hnvh I84.
Djvid Brown, Pn/?plelcf( ii iitl flit J lli t ‘pi l li, l-4-- I Li 1iclwsk’r.
\Ianc1w’Wr University Press, 2002, pp 52—53.
(IIJN/1 — AiflPA’f ‘((‘1i1il/ .t(lt1i iii tHil d(’f(’111 iIiL’(’f1\’(!/!t1i’ 25 June 2()(14 iiiLihJe it
trdo’ILdt.
BNJ,\’s InterniLionI Fr.1e Nejt’ter ( Jurope) , s J) lL ti N’raii’ /‘ i. ‘P 1’r ‘<liii
‘ \ I
I)’clipi,i, (iinlt’u’, July 1S, )04,
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Korea and Chinese Taipei. On 31 March 2004, MOFCOM
launched the investigations. The preliminary determinations were
issued on 31 Ma 2005, and final determinations were issued on 30
September 2005. In both the preliminary and final
determinations, the MOFCOM made positive findings on all three
elements of imposition of anti-dumping measures, ie, existence of
dumping, substantial injury to the domestic industry, and causal
relationship between dumping and injurv. According to the final
determinations, the dumping margins of the US companies were
as high as 652%ô1
The US producers held strong reservations over this decision.
On 29 November 2005, the U.S. producers submitted a petition to
MOFCOM requesting reconsideration of the September
2005
determination. On 6 January 2006, the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) further informed China that it would bring
a case in the WTO unless China removes the antidumping order
by 9 January 2006.
On 9 January 2006, China announced that it has
decided to remove the antidumping duties after an administrative
reconsideration.
As indicated by a senior US trade official, there are two major
problems with
the decision: lack of transparency and insufficient
evidence for the determination of injury arid causation.62 Indeed,
both have been perennial problems
in Chinese antidumping
proceedings.
Even before China’s accession to the WTO, many
WTO Members have raised these issues in the working party
negotiations. According
to these WTO Members, “the current
investigations by
the Chinese authority would he judged to he
inconsistent with the {WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement]
if China
were a WTO Member of the WTO todav”.’3 Specifically, the
WTO
Members were most concerned with the following problems:
Ministry of Commerce of China, Final
flch’n,ii,iatiiis en flit’ A11huiz4?71piii 17iZk’ShflfU1iS en
tlic Kraft IJ,u’thenni j;,miiicLc ri inn fi’ii fnn,i flic LIS 77,ailand, Kerca and
cliint’sc Taipei (on
file with author).
hi.
“ hi.
hi hi.
“ BNA’s international Trade Reporter, Cliipii Lifts fliiiiipiiig
Pntu’s on Lint’rbeard in Fti’ of
LI,. Threat of W() Precccdiiigs, January ii, 2006.
‘vVorking Party Report, pam 147.
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in certain cases, the basis k)r calculating dumping margins
for a preliminary affirmative deterni ination was not
disclosed to interested parties. Furthermore, the
determination of injury and causation did not appear to have
been made on an objective examination of sufficient evidence.
In the views of these members, bringing the Chinese anti-
dumping rules into compliance with the WTC) Agreement on
its face was not sufficient. WTO-consistencv had to be
secured substantively as well”
After its accession to the Wi’O, China issued a new
Antiduning Regulation, which was further revised in 2004. In
order to complement these regulations1 the Chinese government
also issued several detailed implementing rules, covering virtually
every procedural step of the investigations. Problems, however,
are far from eliminated. As noted by the USTR in its 2005 Ruport h)
Coiigre’ss oil Lliiiias Vv’TO Conipliniicc,
“There continue to he a growing number of reports from US
respondents and respondents from other WTO members,
complaining about the lack of detailed information made
available to parties and the lack of disclosure of the facts that
form the basis for decisions made by the
administering
authorities IB1I [MOFCOM’s Bureau of Industry lnjuri’
Investigationj continues to have a spotty record of making
available to
respondents materials generated and submitted
during the course of its injury investigations, a situation that
it has not improved. Compounding this problem is the
highly limited disclosure to interested parties by China’s AD
authorities of the essential facts
underlying the decisions and
calculations in both dumping and injury investigations Ihis
dearth of disclosure inipairs the ability of US companies to
mount an effective defense in Chinese AD investigations.
Like last year, many respondents have criticized China’s AD
authorities for not providing appropriate opportunities for
business to comment on and provide input into the
‘ Id.
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government’ s deliberati ye process, the lack of domestic
producer information or untimely access to such information,
and the
opaque nature of decision making in injury
investigations, including demonstrating the causal
link
between injury and dumping” .
In the current case, transparency seems to be lacking in two
aspects.t First, in its Pith/ic I\JoticL’ [or the Initiation A;ltid1111l1i11(
I;iz’cstigatioiis, the MOFCOM, in making
its determination that the
application has been made by
or on behalf of the domestic
industry, simply noted that the collective output
of the domestic
producers launching the application
accounted for 31.6% and
33.9% of the total production of the
like product in 2002 and 2003,
while the collective output of the producers supporting
the
application accounted
for 42.6% and 50.5% of the total production
of the like product in 2002 and
2003. No further details, such as the
exact data on the total domestic production and the
collective
output of the applicants,
have been provided. This might
lead to
doubts about the legitimacy of the
initiation of the investigations.
Second, in the determination of normal value, export price
and
dumping margin, the
authorities just gave the facts considered
and the determinations made, hut it never gave sufficient
information on how the relevant data has been obtained, what are
the detailed criteria for such analysis, or how the calculations
are
done. Such comparison normally
would involve foreign exchange.
The Chinese authorities never made clear, however,
as to which
rate it uses in the calculation.
With
regard to injury determination,
article 3.1 of the Anti-
dumping Agreement requires
such determination to he “based on
positive
evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a)
the volume of the dumped imports
and ihe effect of the dumped
imports on prices
in the domestic market for like products,
and (b)
P 2k).
MOFC’( )M, uI,inl ‘tt’rnthinti” ,, (lic A11ti-i1li?npl?I(c !,i’Ctltlth)1J
)Jl tilt [ll1!kfltt’d LInH’
InH’iJi’d HItI IinrbnnI PimIiict frnni (lit LIiit’d tah’s
i7,aiIn,:I, nrt’a iz,itl Uiiiict’ Taip’i
3() Sptinibcr 2D05, atthnicnt to
\1()FC(’)1 Pub1i Notice 2005 No. bO on the t\ntidumping
t\ntidumping Invcstigitiofl
on the Imported Un—bleaclwd
KrIt Linerboard Products
w(uhil’Ie t http:J/ www.motcontgQy.c n/artR le/ hId 20fl502
01kS7 197.hJ.
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the COflSU’t.4UCflt ifl1j)Ct of these iiports OIl dofliestic producers of
SLICh products. Article 3.4 further demands that “[t]1i
e\dFfliFhEltiOll Of t1i impact of the dumped imports on the domestic
industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant
economic factors and indices having a hearing on the state of the
industry, including actual and potential decline in sales, profits,
output, market share, prod uctivity, return on investments, or
utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the
magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential
negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages,
growth, ability to raise capital or investments” (emphasis added).
By explicitly stating that “[tjhis list is not exhaustive, nor can one
or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance”, the
same article also
requires the investigating authorities to adopt a
balanced
approach in such examination. In the current case,
however, what the investigating authorities had was at best a
mixed picture. Indeed, many key factors have indicated that the
Chinese domestic
companies are doing very well. For example,
the
output, volume and revenue of sales, output, wages and
market share of domestic
companies have all increased
significantly over the period under investigation. Even some of the
negative impacts are just the natural results of other positive
developments: for example, the investigating authorities cited to
the decline in
employment in the sector, hut this is the only logical
consequence following rapid increase in productivity. With such
mixed picture, the investigating authorities should have at least
explained as to why some of the factors were given more weight
than other factors in the determination, but unfortunately no such
explanation was given.
In terms of the determination of injury, the Anti-dumping
Agreement requires the decision to he “based on an examination
of all relevant evidence before the authorities”.t in particular, the
authorities shall also “examine any known factors other than the
dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic
industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not
Arti1t’
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be attributed to the dumped imports”. The article also gives a
few
examples of the relevant factors, which indude, inter aim, “the
volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices,
contraction in demand or
changes in the patterns of consumption,
trade restrictive practices of and competition between
the foreign
and domestic producers, developments in technology and the
export performance and prod uctivitv
of the domestic industry” h)
In this case, however, it seems that the causal relationship between
the dumped imports and the injury, if any, is rather tenuous.
Instead, as argued by the American
Forest & Paper Association, it
seems that two domestic factors are principally responsible for
driving down prices in
the Chinese market over the period of
investigation: “(1) rapid expansion of Chinese production capacity
for the (product], and (2) overcapacity in the corrugated
box
industry in China. Put simply, there is too much
Chinese domestic
capacity for the (product] relative to
demand. Exacerbating this
relative excess supply situation is
the competitive pressure being
exerted by corrugated box producers
who are also facing an excess
capacity situation”.
Even though this determination
has been struck down in the
administrative reconsideration process, the
MOFCOM have
chosen to avoid overturning the decision
on substantive issues
and rely primarily on procedural
issues instead. In the
Administrative Reconsideration Decision, the MOFCOM
only
provided
one ground for
the reversal. That is:
“In our opinion, when
an administrative agency makes
a
specific administrative
decision, it shall abide by the relevant
legal provisions including
the procedural provisions.
According to article
25 of the Antidumping Regulations,
before making the final
determination, the MOFCOM shall
notify all known stakeholders of the basic
facts that it relied
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Id.
,j(1’flhii?1 h) 17u’ ()ftice f ilic t I,iifrI f11tL’ TIaLI’ Rq’rL’s’lltntirL’ i
TradL’ Barru’rs h Ftn’st
ProI1ILt fr 71w Niiti,iaI TmIL’ Etinatt’ R7rf
n F’,iiii Tim Ic Barricrs in, X;?1t’rluz11 F,ist
& Papcr Ac)cuitin,I, 21 R’ccmbcr
2004, p available
at
ttp:/J
aflagelnent/ CofltefltDISpIay.ct1 i&çoflteT’ItI[)—
1033h.
China’s Legal Battle in the WTO 147
on in making its fiflal dOtVrflhi1’l1tiO1i. In this case, even
though the investigating authority has disclosed to (1ll
relevant stakeholders of SOniC of the basic facts that it relied
on in making the final determination, it failed to disclose
some other relevant basic facts that shall be disclosed
according to the law. For example, in Part Vi (ii) of the final
determinations, the investigating authorities mentioned the
facts that Jiangsu Nine Dragons Papers Company and
J iangsu Liwen Paper Miii has put new assembly lines in use
and the domestic production capacity of China has further
expanded as part of its analysis on whether the establishment
of new firms and competition among firms are factors that
contribute to the deterioration of the operations (of the
domestic firms). When the investigating a ii thori ties made the
disclosures before the final determinations were given,
however, they did not include such basic facts. I’hiis, it was
impossible for the relevant stakeholders to make comments
on such facts and this violated the provisions in article 2.5 of
the Antiduniping Regulations. According to the provisions
under article XXVIII of the Law on Administrative
Reconsideration of the People’s Republic of China, we hereby
decide to revoke Notice [2005 j60 of the MOFCOM”.
As we can see trorn above, contrary to the gloomy predictions
made before China’s cCceSSion, the DSS so far has boen luite
effective in dealing with China. In the limited number of casus that
China has participated, especially in the cases in which China was
on the defensive side, China either cnose to try to reach some
amicable solution heore a formal
complaint was brought before
the WTO or to settle the case through private consultahonc with
the
complainants rather than letting the case going all the way to
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the panel and Appellate Body levels. Thus, instead of being the
defiant of the multilateral trading system, China is actually much
less
aggressive than most of the other WTO Members, especial1’
those with trade volumes comparable to that of China. In a recent
article, the author has discussed several possible explanations to
explain China’s policy since its accession.72
There is no guarantee,
however, that these factors will always stay the same. Indeed, an
over-aggressive litigation strategy against
China in the WTO
might be the ictim of its
own success: when DSS is used too
frequently, it might just turn itself into a catalyst for change
in the
litigation strategy of China
at one point. Actually one can start
to
discern some signs of such policy change
in the recent statements
made by the senior officials from the MOFCOM. In a recent
official interview, for example, Mr. Shang Ming, the
Director
General of the Treaty and Law Department of MOFCOM,
stated
that China should not be afraid of using the DSS.73 Instead,
he
argues that China
should become a more active user of the
system.74 Once
such policy is accepted by
the senior leadership of
China, the other WTO Members will find that they
will have to
face a much difficult opponent and
it will he too late to close the
Pandora’s Box again.
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